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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20260427T140000
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SUMMARY:CISPA DLS / Michael Bailey from the Georgia Institute of Technology
URL:https://cispa.de/en/dls-bailey
DESCRIPTION:Trust is predicated upon risk. Accepting vulnerability to a socio-technical system such as the Domain Name System (DNS) means accepting the possibility of harms arising from both overreliance on technical components and misplaced trust in operators\, registrars\, and governing bodies. Failures in technical reliability may cause inconvenience or replanning\, but failures by people and institutions evoke betrayal. When risk lies primarily in the technical layer\, the security community often uses the language of trustworthiness\, described as correctness\, reliability\, and security\, though this usage has been critiqued as overly broad. In this sense\, DNS largely works: Verisign processes roughly 450 billion queries every day\, maintains more than 170 million records\, and has sustained 100 percent uptime for .com. Protections including DNSSEC and encrypted DNS continue to improve authenticity\, confidentiality\, and integrity\, with global adoption rates of 35 percent and 24 percent\, respectively. In contrast\, phishing\, typo-\, TLD-\, and combo-squatting\, and brand impersonation attacks undermine users’ trust not because DNS fails as infrastructure\, but because of how the namespace is managed by operators\, registrars\, and governing bodies. These attacks strike at the heart of trust\; in conditions of naming ambiguity\, users are forced to depend on the benevolence of those who steward the namespace.\n \nThe key challenge in restoring trust lies in bridging the semantic gap: in DNS the space between a syntactically correct resolution and one aligned with the user’s intended destination\, between what they typed and where they meant to go. When attackers exploit this gap\, users blame the attacker but also feel betrayed by the institutions responsible for protecting naming. In this talk\, we present recent work with Vinny Adjibi and Fabian Monrose on recognizing and addressing this gap. We show that user naming errors are not mostly typos\; semantic and visual transformations are more frequent and\, in many cases\, more harmful. We show that existing coping methods\, such as defensive registrations\, cover only a small portion of this space\, even when unprotected domains receive significant real traffic. We show that UDRP\, intended as the backstop for protecting names\, is complex and nuanced\, full of misaligned incentives that often raise issues of fairness\, inevitably undermining trust. Together\, these results show where trust leaks occur in DNS and what may be required to bridge the semantic gap so that naming sustains trust.\n\nCISPA C0\, room 0.05 or Zoom: https://cispa-de.zoom-x.de/j/68726970505?pwd=8AjDqNBTTI7HY6wlDg3X2OaQMPQH8b.1
LOCATION:CISPA C0\, room 0.05 (Stuhlsatzenhaus 5\, 66123 Saarbruecken) 
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DESCRIPTION:CISPA DLS / Michael Bailey from the Georgia Institute of Technology
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