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UID:ics.terminsysteme.de1665415019
DTSTAMP:20221010T171659
CLASS:PUBLIC
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221018T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221018T120000
LOCATION:https://cispa-de.zoom.us/j/92147275099?pwd=Q3dSWE8xU251WmY2czJzclIxYTBDUT09
SUMMARY:CISPA DLS / Sebastian Schinzel – Email (in)security: room for improvement or lost cause?
DESCRIPTION:Email remains the most widely used and presumably the most \nimportant digital communication medium on the Internet. But what is the \ncurrent state of research regarding the security of emails? In this \ntalk, I’ll present three research papers covering this topic.\n\n1. The Security of STARTTLS in the email context.\nSMTP, IMAP and POP3 are plain text protocols that were designed in the \nearly 80s. They did not provide authenticity and confidentiality of \nemails. Later, in the late 90s, the protocols were extended to support \nTLS. For this, STARTTLS commands were introduced to the protocols. The \nUSENIX Security 2021 paper „Why TLS is better without STARTTLS“ \nuncovered novel vulnerability in the STARTTLS technology.\n\n2. Novel oracle attacks against S/MIME and OpenPGP.\nPadding oracle attacks such as Bleichenbacher’s „Million Questions \nAttack“ or Vaudenay’s Attack against PKCS#7 padding are well-known and \nwere used to break encryption protocols such als TLS or XML Encryption. \nS/MIME and OpenPGP use similar cryptographic constructions and are — at \nleast in theory — also vulnerable to these attacks. The attacks were \nthought to be not exploitable in the email context because the victim \nwould need to open encryption attacker mails, decrypt them and manually \ncommunicate the result of the encryption to the attacker. The USENIX \nSecurity study 2023 „Content-Type: multipart/oracle - Tapping into \nFormat Oracles in Email End-to-End Encryption“ analyzes ways to \npractically exploit these vulnerabilities in the email context.\n\n3. Expert usability study of email encryption using OpenPGP.\nMultiple research papers in the last 20 years showed that email \nencryption with OpenPGP is hard to use, especially for laymen without \ndeep technical knowledge. But are expert users able to use it properly? \nFor example, are expert users able to detect spoofed emails that try to \nmimic valid signatures? In the study „"I don’t know why I check \nthis...'' - Investigating Expert Users' Strategies to Detect Email \nSignature Spoofing Attacks“ (USENIX SOUPS 2022), we confronted expert \nusers with emails that may or may not have forged email signatures. The \nstudy uncovered that even expert users struggle to detect spoofed emails \nwith forged digital signatures.\n\nProf. Dr. Sebastian Schinzel is full professor for IT security \nat the University of Applied Sciences Münster and leads the IT security \nresearch group. His reasearch topics are applied cryptography, system \nsecurity and medical IT security.
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