AirDrop and Quick Share: CISPA Researcher Discovers Six Previously Unknown Vulnerabilities
Arash Ale Ebrahim investigates software and protocols that receive relatively little attention because, at first glance, they may not seem particularly important. This is how he came to focus on AirDrop and Quick Share. “What particularly motivated me was that these services provide so-called zero-click attack surfaces,” he explains. “In this context, that means an attacker within radio range can interact with a device and invoke certain protocol functions without the affected person first accepting a file or taking any action.” His research aims to uncover previously unknown attack vectors of this kind. “For several years now, there have been repeated reports of attacks targeting specific individuals, such as journalists or members of the political opposition,” Ebrahim continues. “Against this backdrop, I wanted to investigate these attack surfaces, identify vulnerabilities, and help get them fixed.”
To systematically investigate the security mechanisms of AirDrop and Quick Share, Ale Ebrahim first reconstructed the underlying protocol workflows by analyzing how they operate technically. One particular challenge was Apple’s proprietary wireless protocol AWDL, which the researchers first had to familiarize themselves with. “After that, I wrote a simple script that could send a valid packet to the AirDrop or Quick Share component. Once that worked successfully, I turned the script into a fuzzer,” the researcher explains. This led to the development of “AIRFUZZ,” a tool specifically designed to automatically detect software vulnerabilities in the complex, multilayered structure of these protocols. Using AIRFUZZ, Ale Ebrahim was able to systematically test different inputs and ultimately identify several vulnerabilities.
Using AIRFUZZ, Ale Ebrahim discovered vulnerabilities in both Quick Share and AirDrop. “The vulnerabilities in AirDrop were predominantly denial-of-service vulnerabilities,” the researcher explains. “These vulnerabilities can be used to disable the target device—or specific functions of the device.” Specifically, he found a stack overflow, a null-pointer dereference, and a fatal assertion in AirDrop. Put simply, these errors can cause the affected software to crash, potentially making certain device functions temporarily unavailable. These vulnerabilities occurred when certain preconditions in the AirDrop protocol were met.
The findings for Quick Share were more extensive. “Two vulnerabilities affected the security of communications, while another affected the Windows version of the software,” Ale Ebrahim continues. “There we found a use-after-free vulnerability that caused Remote-Code-Execution.” A use-after-free vulnerability occurs when a program accesses memory that has already been freed. Depending on the circumstances and the possibility of controlling the resulting memory corruption, such a vulnerability may lead to a crash or, in some cases, remote code execution. This means attackers can exploit such vulnerabilities to execute their own code on the affected device. Ale Ebrahim responsibly disclosed all the vulnerabilities he discovered to the respective vendors. According to him, they have since been fixed.
One important takeaway from Ale Ebrahim’s research is that the security risks associated with these services may have been underestimated for a long time. “This may be because the two communicating devices have to be physically close to each other,” he explains. “However, our research shows that complex and sophisticated attacks can also be carried out through these services. Many people are unaware of the potential consequences of making their devices reachable through such protocols and services.” Ale Ebrahim therefore recommends that users regularly review their settings and disable these features when they are not needed.
Even after the paper’s publication, Ale Ebrahim, a research assistant in CISPA-Faculty Nils Ole Tippenhauer’s research group, remains interested in zero-click attack surfaces. “Our group continues to investigate AirDrop and similar services for these kinds of vulnerabilities,” he explains. “Our current focus is primarily on Apple’s image and message parsers. These also constitute zero-click attack surfaces. That’s why we need to continue our research to potentially uncover even more serious vulnerabilities.” This work has become easier for the researcher thanks to the solid infrastructure he has already built and the suitable fuzzer he has developed. “This allows us to probe the systems more deeply and investigate other interesting vulnerabilities,” Ale Ebrahim concludes.
Scope: The study examines security vulnerabilities in AirDrop and Quick Share.
Method: Researchers use reverse engineering and a custom-built fuzzer, AIRFUZZ, to test the protocols.
Findings: The study identifies six previously unknown vulnerabilities, including remote code execution.
Impact: The findings highlight the underestimated security risks of proximity-transfer services and the importance of reviewing device settings. All vulnerabilities have since been fixed.