Studying the feasibility of Byzantine Agreement (BA) in realistic fault models is an important question in the area of distributed computing and cryptography. In this work, we revisit the mixed fault model with Byzantine (malicious) faults and omission faults put forth by Hauser, Maurer, and Zikas (TCC 2009), who showed that BA (andMPC) is possible with t Byzantine faults, s send faults (whose outgoing messages may be dropped) and r receive faults (whose incoming messages may be lost) if n > 3t + r + s. We generalize their techniques and results by showing that BA is possible if n > 2t + r + s, given the availability of a cryptographic setup. Our protocol is the first to match the recent lower bound of Eldefrawy, Loss, and Terner (ACNS 2022) for this setting.
Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC)
2023-11-27
2024-12-20