Membership Inference Against DNA Methylation Databases

Summary

Biomedical data sharing is one of the key elements fostering the advancement of biomedical research but poses severe risks towards the privacy of individuals contributing their data, as already demonstrated for genomic data. In this paper, we study whether and to which extent DNA methylation data, one of the most important epigenetic elements regulating human health, is prone to membership inference attacks, a critical type of attack that reveals an individual’s participation in a given database. We design and evaluate three different attacks exploiting published summary statistics, among which one is based on machine learning and another is exploiting the dependencies between genome and methylation data. Our extensive evaluation on six datasets containing a diverse set of tissues and diseases collected from more than 1,300 individuals in total shows that such membership inference attacks are effective, even when the target’s methylation profile is not accessible. It further shows that the machine-learning approach outperforms the statistical attacks, and that learned models are transferable across different datasets.