Unexpected cost reductions in recent years have significantly lowered the hurdle for non-state attackers to gain access to ground stations that can send malicious messages to satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of on-orbit friendly jamming as a measure to protect LEO satellites from unauthorized and malicious ground station transmissions. We assess the feasibility of integrating an orbital Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) by simulating real-life scenarios. This assessment will lay the groundwork for future experiments involving real satellites. As part of our simulation, we considered a scenario involving a single satellite and an attacker ground station, with a set transmission time. In this scenario, we identified 41 satellites in close proximity that could potentially act as an IPS. Additionally, in a scenario focused on long-term protection, where a single ground station functions as an attacker, we observed that large satellite constellations, such as Starlink, provide substantial protection coverage by acting as an IPS for a specific satellite over the course of a day.
Security for Space Systems (3S)
2024-07-25
2024-12-13