Attack-detection mechanisms should be able to reliably detect, predict, and understandably explain both known and novel threats, while also being able to cope with evasion techniques (like obfuscation, polymorphism, or stealth low-volume attacks). They should not just be able to detect any critical incident, but also raise alarms when it matters only; the more false alarms are raised, the higher the risk that users will ignore warnings or even disable the detection permanently. Moreover, to provide a strong line of defense, attack detection methods should be complemented by suitable defensive technologies, ideally selected autonomously by the system under attack, to counter whatever threat it encounters. In this research area we pursue this ideal, currently amongst others by focusing on the detection and analysis of modern malware, on the prevention and attribution of DDoS attacks, and on the identification and mitigation of novel system vulnerabilities.
EuroS&P
Proceedings of the 6th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy6th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy
USENIX-Security
USENIX Security SymposiumUSENIX Security Symposium
SP
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
ASIACCS
Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS '21)AsiaCCS 2021
FC
Financial Cryptography and Data SecurityFinancial Cryptography and Data Security 2021
FC
Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2021Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2021
