Attack-detection mechanisms should be able to reliably detect, predict, and understandably explain both known and novel threats, while also being able to cope with evasion techniques (like obfuscation, polymorphism, or stealth low-volume attacks). They should not just be able to detect any critical incident, but also raise alarms when it matters only; the more false alarms are raised, the higher the risk that users will ignore warnings or even disable the detection permanently. Moreover, to provide a strong line of defense, attack detection methods should be complemented by suitable defensive technologies, ideally selected autonomously by the system under attack, to counter whatever threat it encounters. In this research area we pursue this ideal, currently amongst others by focusing on the detection and analysis of modern malware, on the prevention and attribution of DDoS attacks, and on the identification and mitigation of novel system vulnerabilities.
CCS
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
CCS
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications SecurityACM CCS 2020
10th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet
USENIX-Security
29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20)
USENIX-Security
Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium
