Browser extension stores operate independently of each other and each have their own governance structure, creating a situation where threats identified on one platform can persist on others. We present the first cross-store analysis of security inconsistencies between the Chrome Web Store (CWS) and Edge Add-ons Store (EAS). We study extensions published on both stores, and discover 11 malicious extensions (affecting almost 134k users) that were present on the EAS, despite having already been removed from the CWS for containing malware. These extensions persisted on Edge for an average of 551 days (1.5 years) after their Chrome counterparts were removed for malware, with some even receiving updates during this period. We additionally find that malicious extensions change their names and developer names more often than other extensions and that these changes are larger. We also examine extensions that have been reinstated after having been removed (e.g., for containing malware), revealing inconsistencies in extension store governance. These findings show that malicious actors can exploit the lack of coordination in an interconnected extension ecosystem.
Workshop on Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADWeb 2026)
2026-02-27
2026-02-20