On the Feasibility of TTL-Based Filtering for DRDoS Mitigation

Zusammenfassung

A major disturbance for network providers in recent years have been Distributed Reflective Denial-of-Service (DRDoS) attacks. In such an attack, the adversary spoofs the IP address of a victim and sends a flood of tiny packets to vulnerable services. The services then respond to spoofed the IP, flooding the victim with large replies. Led by the idea that an attacker cannot fabricate the number of hops a packet travels between amplifier and victim, Hop Count Filtering (HCF) mechanisms that analyze the Time-to-Live (TTL) of incoming packets have been proposed as a solution. In this paper, we evaluate the feasibility of using HCF to mitigate DRDoS attacks. To that end, we detail how a server can use active probing to learn TTLs of alleged packet senders. Based on data sets of benign and spoofed NTP requests, we find that a TTL-based defense could block over 75 % of spoofed traffic, while allowing 85 % of benign traffic to pass. To achieve this performance, however, such an approach must allow for a tolerance of ±2 hops. Motivated by this, we investigate the tacit assumption that an attacker cannot learn the correct TTL value. By using a combination of tracerouting and BGP data, we build statistical models which allow to estimate the TTL within that tolerance level. We observe that by wisely choosing the used amplifiers, the attacker is able to circumvent such TTL-based defenses. Finally, we argue that any (current or future) defensive system based on TTL values can be bypassed in a similar fashion, and find that future research must be steered towards more fundamental solutions to thwart any kind of IP spoofing attacks.