Microarchitectural attacks and reverse-engineering efforts rely on inferring the cache state of cache lines. While high-resolution timers traditionally enable this, such timers are increasingly restricted or unavailable to unprivileged users on modern ARM64 systems. We introduce a fuzzing-based methodology to automatically discover instruction sequences that leak cache state into architectural state—without timing measurements. Our proof-of-concept, ExfilState, uses differential testing, F-score ranking, and covert-channel verification to identify architectural side channels on ARM64 CPUs. Across 160 devices with 37 microarchitectures—including smartphones, laptops, and cloud servers—ExfilState uncovers 5 undocumented side channels, 2 of which are reliably and widely exploitable. We demonstrate their practical impact with a timer-free Spectre variant, a cache-based AES key-recovery attack, and a novel defense mechanism that aborts sensitive algorithms on eviction of victim cache lines. Our findings show that architectural side channels are both real and exploitable, even in environments without timers, broadening the attack surface on modern ARM64 platforms.
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
2025-10-13
2025-09-11