SEKA: Secretless Key Exchange and Authentication in LiFi Networks

Zusammenfassung

Light Fidelity (LiFi) networks transmit information via light waves and are an interesting alternative to Radio Frequency networks: as light can be confined easily, LiFi provides better performance and makes eavesdropping attacks much more difficult. A core application of LiFi networks is self-contained and local networks among a group of autonomous devices, e.g., in industrial or medical environments. Cryptographic protocols are used to secure these networks, however the key exchange sometimes relies solely on the confineability of light signals and sends key material in plain over the network. This is clearly not desirable from a security perspective and newer standards recommend key exchange protocols to establish shared keys. A crucial part in any authenticated key exchange protocol is how to bootstrap trust, e.g., by assuming a PKI, pre-installed keys or an out-of-band-channel. Well established solutions exist, but they are not ideal for the type of self-contained networks targeted by LiFi communication. In this work we investigate how the physical propertiesmof a LiFi channel can be used to replace these mechanisms, resulting in a more convenient and also more efficient solution for key exchange. To this end we propose a new type of secret-less key exchange (SEKA) that does not rely on any pre-shared secrets, and instead runs in two phases: a short bootstrap phase where we make stronger assumptions on the physical security, ruling out active attacks. This can be realized by putting all devices in a closed room, taking advantage of the light’s confineability feature. The bootstrap phase is followed by a more classical key-exchange phase, where the actual key material gets exchanged in the presence of active attacks – relying on the shared states from the bootstrap phase. We formally define this new type of key-exchange protocol which offers authenticated key exchange with post-compromise security without relying on pre-shared secrets. We then show that a simpler and more efficient version of the signed Diffie-Hellmann protocol, now relying on MACs instead of signatures for the mutual authentication, can be proven secure in our model. Finally, a proof-of-concept implementation of the SEKA protocol is evaluated in a testbed demonstrating the efficiency gains of our approach.